The Bitcoin Attacks are NOT About Money | Simon Dixon

— Simon Dixon and Nathan discuss the aftermath of BIP-110's failed chain split attempt on Saturday, analyzing why nodes (reaching 20% adoption) could not persuade miners to accept consensus-level changes despite unprecedented mobilization.

— The coordinated infrastructure attacks on Coldcard (low-entropy bug), BTCPay, Zeus, Boltz, and Lightning services suggest a unified message: pushing users toward custodial solutions and away from self-custody.

— Developer centralization emerged as a core concern during BIP-110 debates; the loss of Knots as a competing implementation to Bitcoin Core leaves the ecosystem more dependent on a single codebase.

— Simon frames all recent incidents under a "guilty until proven innocent" security model, treating infrastructure failures as potential intelligence operations rather than accidents.

— The philosophical contrast between BIP-110 resistance (nodes vs. miners) and the earlier Segwit2x battle (miners vs. nodes) reveals that consensus-level changes in Bitcoin are "incredibly hard" regardless of which faction pushes them.

— Self-custody requires active participation, continuous education, and proof-of-work; it is not a passive "set and forget" strategy like traditional assets.

— Assume all major infrastructure incidents targeting hardened Bitcoiners are coordinated attacks; treat security threats as guilty-until-proven-innocent rather than naive accident attribution.

— Rebuild your self-custody setup with multi-signature schemes, dice-rolled entropy, diversified hardware vendors, and periodic security audits; passive ownership invites centralized capture and regulatory control.

— Do not fork or exit Bitcoin for alternative implementations in protest of policy disagreements; the fight for decentralization, node independence, and miner diversity continues within the canonical chain—defecting to a "shitcoin" abandons the only monetary system with genuine scarcity and network effect.